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Abstract
This paper intends to contribute to the (bounded rationality) foundations of trust.
After reviewing the extant definitions, I establish the formal structure of situations involving
trust. In that context, I examine the paradoxical situation of (calculative) trust in simple
settings. Then I show how bounded rationality provides a rationale for a concept of trust that
goes beyond that calculative notion. Value systems and possible inconsistency of time
preferences are shown to be crucial elements.
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Trust has been the focus of attention of many writers in recent years, from very
different disciplines: economics (e.g., Arrow, 1974; Hirschman, 1984; Dasgupta, 1988;
Kreps, 1990; Williamson, 1993; Casadesus-Masanell, 2004), sociology (Granovetter, 1985;
Zucker, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Giddens, 1990), political science (Fukuyama, 1995; Misztal,
1998; Seligman, 1997), and management (Barney and Hansen, 1997; Shapiro et al., 1992;
Mayer et al., 1995; Kramer and Tyler, 1996). Yet, as many scholars have noted, no common
ground for the treatment of trust exists, in spite of various attempts in that direction. The
importance of the subject, and the growing interest in it, are nevertheless widely recognized.
Arrow (1974) was one of the first writers in economics to underscore the importance of trust
in economic life:
“Consider what is thought of as of higher or more elusive value than pollution
or roads: trust among people. Now, trust has a very high pragmatic value, if nothing
else. Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it
saves a lot of trouble to have a reliance on other people’s word. Unfortunately, this is
not a commodity that can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already
have some doubts about what you’ve bought. Trust and similar values, like loyalty,
or truth-telling, are examples of what an economist would call externalities” (p. 23). 
Many analyses of trust are based on the underlying assumption that trust is rationally
based and instrumental (Kramer and Tyler, 1996, p. 10). But this instrumental view of trust is
not enough to explain its presence in social bodies. In fact, and again according to Kramer
and Tyler, “trust is important only when people have social relationships” (1996:10). Besides,
people often adopt some type of rule-based decision making, based on their own identities as
individuals (March, 1999) and their identification with a group, possibly to protect existing
social values and relationships, even in purely economic terms (Kahneman, Knetsch and
Thaler, 1986). 
Three recent entries in the field show the different approaches to the problem of trust.
Korczynski (2000) attempts to integrate the sociological and economic approaches; James
(2001) tries to show the contradiction of some possible interpretations of the rationalistic
approach that is typical of the economics-based literature; and Casadesus-Masanell (2004)
shows how ethical standards and altruism can arise in an agency theory context. 
This paper intends to contribute to an integration of the different concepts of trust
through the methods of formal analysis. It attempts to establish the decision-theoretical bases
on which trust can be founded, showing that it follows from a rigorous definition and analysis
of the problem that bounded rationality and value systems are essential for a concept of trust
that goes beyond mere calculativeness.The paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly review the definitions of trust that
can be found in the literature, and establish the basic logical structure of situations potentially
involving trust. Then, I proceed to examine simple settings where the notion of (calculative)
trust is paradoxical: in fact, either there is no problem, or else there is no solution. Next, I
show that uncertainty about preferences is an essential element in calculative trust, while the
analysis of bounded rationality provides a reason for a concept of trust that goes well beyond
the calculative notion discussed before. Value systems provide a basis for trust in integrity,
and intertemporal consistency of preferences provides a basis for trust in character. Finally, I
relate the instrumental-rational approach to trust to the social and cultural approaches. 
DEFINING TRUST AND SETTING THE PROBLEM
Arrow, in the quotation that opened this paper, considered trust rather ‘elusive’. Both
Gambetta (1988) and Williamson (1993) used the same word (‘elusive’), which implies
difficulty in finding a satisfactory definition. Some authors make trust implicitly equivalent to
truth-telling, or to keeping one’s promises (Dasgupta, 1988), although Dasgupta attributes a
slightly different meaning to the concept as well. Williamson (1993), on the other hand, does
not consider trust to be an important concept: according to him, it is just another name for
risk, and therefore all matters related to trust are mere calculation. Interestingly, though, in
the same paper he accepts that, under the heading of ‘personal trust’, there is something
involved in the word ‘trust’ that goes beyond mere calculation. 
In a much more behaviorally oriented paper, Gabarro acknowledged that:
“Trust has been defined or operationalized in the literature in many different
ways, including the level of openness that exists between two people, the degree to
which one person feels assured that another will not take malevolent or arbitrary
actions, and the extent to which one person can expect predictability in the other’s
behavior in terms of what is ‘normally’ expected of a person acting in good faith”
(1978: 294).
Thus, trust has to do with two economic agents. Zand, following Deutsch (1962),
defined trust as “actions that (a) increase one’s vulnerability, (b) to another whose behavior is
not under one’s control, (c) in a situation in which the penalty (disutility) one suffers if the
other abuses that vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if the other does
not abuse this vulnerability” (1972: 230).
Dasgupta stresses the second point: having the correct expectations about the other’s
behavior before that behavior can be monitored (1988: 51). Therefore, one agent makes the
decision to trust first, and the other agent makes the decision of whether to honor that trust
later on, with no monitoring.
Many authors have adopted the essence of Zand’s definition – except perhaps point
(c), which is not crucial to many aspects of the analysis. Kreps, for instance, implicitly adopts
a similar concept when he presents the analysis of trust as a “one-sided version of the
prisoner’s dilemma game” (1990: 101). Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, in a paper that is
intended to be integrative of previous research, define trust as:
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based
on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (1995: 712).
2Barney and Hansen adopt a similar point of view: “an exchange party worthy of trust
is one that will not exploit the other’s exchange vulnerabilities” (1997: 6), which is practically
the opposite of Williamson’s notion of opportunism, as the willingness to profit at the expense
of others, or “a condition of self-interest seeking with guile” (1985, p. 30). Korczynski
recognizes that in “much of the growing literature on trust the concept is intimately tied in
with vulnerability or risk”; and that the literature “is replete with categorizations of types of
trust, from rational calculative trust, altruistic or blind trust, to distinctions made between
personal trust, and trust in abstract systems and institutions...” (2000:3).
Basic trust structure
I will adopt the Kreps formulation, which is consistent with the essential points that
the above definitions have in common. The structure of that formulation is based on the
following points:
1)  The situation involves two decision makers, A (the trustor) and B (the trustee).
The decision-making process is sequential: A makes the first decision (whether
or not to ‘trust’ B); and, if the decision is ‘trust’, B can make the second
decision (‘honor the trust’ or ‘betray’). This second decision determines the
monetary consequences affecting the two decision-makers. If A ‘does not
trust’, B can do nothing and they both get zero. 
2)  The definitional idea that A ‘makes him/herself vulnerable to B’ is formalized
as follows: If A takes the alternative ‘trust’ and B ‘betrays’, then A’s payoff is
negative; while if B ‘honors’, A’s payoff is positive. Therefore, A can gain by
trusting B if that trust is honored, but makes him/herself vulnerable to a loss if
it is not.
3)  B’s payoffs, for the problem to be interesting, must go the other way around:
they should be greater if B ‘betrays’ than if B ‘honors’ (though positive under
both alternatives). If this was not the case, the interests of A and B would be
perfectly aligned, there would be no possible conflict and, therefore, no need
for trust. 
4)  In general, for A, there is uncertainty as to whether B will make the decision to
‘honor’ or to ‘betray’. The (subjective) probability (to A) that B will ‘honor’ is
denoted by p. Of course, the probability of B ‘betraying’ is 1-p. As we will
immediately see, under the preceding assumptions, and if the game is played
only once, p can only be zero. But in other situations, it might not. Explaining
where this p comes from in general situations is one of the major objectives of
this paper. 
This formulation is shown as a decision tree in Figure 1, where the first node (the
square with an ‘A’) represents A’s decision in the usual sense, while the second node
(the square with a ‘B’) represents B’s decision. Thus, from A’s point of view, it is an
uncertainty node, to which A can assign a probability distribution. 
3Figure 1
Initial assumptions
I will assume throughout that the monetary results are ‘fixed’ and cannot be changed
by the interaction of the two agents or by any superior authority. This excludes incentive
systems designed by superior authorities, penalties imposed by such authorities to enforce
possible agreements, or side-payments between the agents. The reason for this is simple: if
payoffs can be changed by someone in order to achieve better results, those better results will
not be based on ‘trust’ but on the new payoffs, and therefore on ‘authority’. Or, in other
words, conditions 1) to 3) above will not hold with respect to the actual payoffs established
by such a system.
Besides, I will assume that before deciding on what action to take, agents can freely
communicate with each other and make their decisions on the basis of any conceivable
agreement (except, of course, those involving transfers of money or monetary equivalents
between them, prohibited in the above paragraph). As I will show, under bounded rationality,
‘persuasion’ may be an important consequence of this communication process.
Other assumptions will change as I develop my argument. To be specific, there are
four possible assumptions that may substantially affect the results of the analysis: 
1) The two agents may value exclusively money or monetary equivalents, or they
may value also some other, perhaps intangible variables, such as a job well-done,
reputation, learning, other people’s welfare, keeping one’s word, and so on.
2) Agents may be certain or uncertain about the payoffs that will obtain under each
alternative. Figure 1 assumes certainty, but it can obviously be generalized to
the case of uncertainty, where payoffs depend on a state variable.
3) Agents may have bounded or unbounded rationality. With unbounded
rationality they have perfect preference orderings, and are able to foresee with
precision the probability of any uncertain circumstance, while with bounded
rationality they may not be sure about which alternative is best for them, or














10 104) A trust situation like the one in Figure 1 may take place only once, or it may be
repeated (not necessarily with the same exact payoffs, or in the same
circumstances) several, or even an infinite number of times.
WHERE IS TRUST UNDER UNBOUNDED RATIONALITY?
The simplest scenario
The simplest possible situation is one where the payoffs are known to both agents
with certainty, agents value money exclusively, have unbounded rationality, and are certain
that the situation will occur only once (i.e., it will not be repeated). 
Analyzing that tree is straightforward. If the only thing that matters to the agents is
money, B, if ‘trusted’, will choose ‘betray’. A, knowing this, will assign zero value to the
probability of B choosing ‘honor’ and, therefore, will choose not to trust B. Both agents will
then end up with zero utility. Of course, this is a Pareto-inferior solution to ‘A trusts & B
honors’, where both would get positive monetary rewards. But playing the game one time
only, and having utility for money only, that is the only feasible alternative. 
Notice that for the problem to be meaningful, the payoff to B in the event that A
‘trusts’ and B ‘honors’ has to be positive. If it is negative, no matter how small, then the final
outcome would still be the status quo (A does not trust & B does nothing), although that
outcome would now not be Pareto-inferior to the solution ‘A trusts & B honors’. The status
quo could then be considered as a ‘compromise’ between the two other possibilities, one
favoring the first agent and the other, the second. 
Of course, if the payoffs to B are reversed (i.e., B gets better results by ‘honoring’
than by ‘betraying’), then there is no problem: it is in B’s interest to ‘honor’ A’s trust. But
then we can hardly speak of trust as a concept, but rather of an incentive system that yields
the right results to both agents.
Proposition 1: In the simplest scenario (utility only for money, unbounded
rationality, certainty about the outcome of each other’s actions, and playing only once), if an
agent A can choose between ‘trusting’ the action of another agent B, then, depending on B’s
payoffs, either there is no place for trust (because the incentives are perfectly aligned) or else
trust cannot exist: both agents will end up in a situation that is Pareto-inferior to the one that
is theoretically feasible. 
Or, in simpler terms, either there is no problem, or else there is no solution. The
reasons for trust to exist, then, will have to be found in different assumptions.
The trust paradox
The solutions typically found in the literature to achieve Pareto optimality change, as I
will show, at least one of the conditions of the simplest scenario above. James (2002) provides an
insightful summary of those solutions: (i) writing explicit contracts; (ii) repeating the interactions
(repeated game); (iii) relying on implicit contracts; and (iv) changing the preferences.
5The first two solutions, as has been suggested already, essentially consist of
changing the payoffs so that both agents have an incentive to choose the alternatives that lead
to the Pareto-optimal solution. Writing explicit contracts is in essence a way to change
(voluntarily and ex-ante, of course) the monetary payoffs to the individuals so that they have
an immediate incentive, compatible with the other party’s incentive, to act in a way that is
Pareto-optimal. Thus, the original problem is replaced (through an agreement between the
agents) by a different one, in which both agents have the right incentive.
The repeated game solution can also be seen as a way to change the monetary
payoffs to the individuals.  In a situation that is going to be repeated a number of times, a tit-
for-tat strategy followed by both players changes the payoffs to the agents. Specifically to B,
whose choice is crucial: the payoff if B betrays remains the same (15), but the payoff if B
honors is replaced by the present value of the former payoff (10) an indefinite (perhaps
infinite) number of times. Thus, B has an incentive to ‘honor’, and A, knowing that, will
‘trust’. Kreps shows how, besides, certainty about having future interactions is not necessary
for that result: provided that the probability of a new interaction is ‘big enough’, it is in the
best interest of B to ‘honor’, and therefore it is in the best interest of A to ‘trust’ (1990: 102).
Therefore, when the only variable under consideration by the agents is the monetary
payoff, in both of the first two solutions to the problem of trust the concept simply vanishes
because it is made unnecessary: if both parties have the incentive that leads to the Pareto-
optimal solution, then there is no need for trust. This is what James (2002) calls the ‘trust
paradox’.
The third and fourth solutions (establishing implicit contracts, and changing the
individuals’ preferences), can be seen as changing the payoffs as well, but changing
the subjective value of the payoffs instead of the objective monetary payoffs. In both
cases, the possible solution necessarily implies that the agents value variables other than the
economic ones; which goes beyond the scenario considered so far. As I will show, trust
acquires full meaning only when other, non-measurable or non-economic variables are taken
into account; discussion of those other variables is therefore deferred until we examine that
case below. 
Thus, using the results of the first and second solutions we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: If agents value only monetary payoffs, explicit side contracts and
repeated-game solutions are just a way of modifying the payoffs so that the need for trust is
eliminated. Therefore, they do not really constitute a solution to the trust problem, but rather
a solution to the optimality problem.
Incorporating uncertainty: trust in judgment and competence
The minimum requirement to add to the previous scenario to provide some
foundation to the notion of trust is uncertainty. To avoid getting into issues relating to risk
and insurance, which have been extensively analyzed in the principal-agent literature, I
assume that both A and B are risk-neutral. So, if both A and B agree on the probabilities of
the different states of nature, the nature of the problem is exactly the same as in the simplest
scenario, but with the expected values of the actions instead of the certain values we had
before. Therefore, again, either there is no problem, or else there is no satisfactory solution.
6The situation changes completely if A and B do not agree, i.e., information about the
states of nature is asymmetrical. Then, even if the payoffs to both agents are identical, and so
there is no conflict in that respect, some notion of ‘trust’ is needed for A to delegate the
decision to B, because given the probability distributions, the possible results may look
different to the two agents: A may prefer one alternative while B prefers the other (see
Appendix 1 for a simple numerical example).
The reasons why A might consider trusting B typically have to do with
decentralization and specialization. It may be necessary for A to delegate the decision to B,
for instance, because the decision is made and implemented at the same time, and A cannot
do it him/herself, or because of A’s information overload. Then, if A believes that B is an
expert in this kind of decisions and therefore ‘knows better’ than him/herself, A may ‘trust’
B’s judgment and accept that he/she makes the decision, which makes A vulnerable to a loss
of 5. The alternative is probably ‘doing nothing’, and therefore risking zero, but with zero
return. Aghion and Tirole (1997) have shown how the transfer of authority from the principal
to an agent increases the agent’s initiative to acquire information, thus reducing the
principal’s information overload, which makes ‘trusting B’ an even better alternative.
The reasons for trusting B’s information (i.e., his/her probability assessments) are
essentially empirical. Since, in our setting (sharing the results), there is no possible conflict of
interest between the two parties, both A and B want ‘the right decision’ to be made. And A
will trust B if B has a record of good decisions that show him/her to be an expert in making
this type of decisions. 
Some of this empirical evidence is often summarized in the standards accepted by a
given profession; and, therefore, A might we willing to trust B, without direct empirical
evidence, if B adheres to the standards of that profession: accreditation, commonly accepted
practices, and so on are the usual ways. But still, the basis of that trust is essentially empirical.
The basic ideas of the last two paragraphs, then, lead us to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Uncertainty and asymmetrical information provide a sufficient
condition for the concept of trust to be meaningful. If one agent believes that another agent
has better information than him/herself, the first agent may ‘trust’ the second agent’s
assessment in order to make the decision. 
Non-measurable variables: trust in preferences
The situation becomes more complex if both A and B have utilities for other
intangible and non-measurable variables, like ‘effort aversion’, ‘effort love’, ‘fun when doing
something’, ‘prestige’, ‘recognition’, ‘loyalty’, ‘friendship’, or whatever. Typically, the set of
all these variables and their impact on the (perceived) well-being of the decision-maker
include what has been called ‘intrinsic motivation’ and possibly other, altruistic motives. We
now continue to assume that both agents have unbounded rationality, so that they know their
own utility functions perfectly and are able to evaluate the possible alternatives without
doubt, and without possibility of ‘changing their minds’. Also, for the time being, the
assumption will be that such preferences are ‘given’. 
Assume that B’s utility function is perfectly known to A (notice that it is in general
irrelevant whether the converse is true, because A plays first). Then, the problem is formally
identical to the one studied in the simplest scenario analyzed before. If the total utilities to A
7and B can be represented by the values in Figure 1 (including both economic and non-
economic variables), again there is no satisfactory solution nor place for trust. It will not
matter whether the monetary results are aligned with total utility or not: total utility is all that
matters in a world of unbounded rationality and perfect information. And, as in the simplest
scenario, depending on B’s total utilities, either there is no problem or else there is no
satisfactory solution.
There is a particularly interesting case, though, in which the agents’ utility for other,
qualitative variables may make possible a ‘solution’ to a situation which in terms of the
monetary variables alone is precisely our simplest scenario. If that is the case, in terms of
these variables alone, we have just seen that a Pareto-optimal solution is impossible. Now, if
the results in terms of total utility are such that the utility to B of honoring is in fact greater
than the utility to B of betraying, then the ‘A trusts & B honors’ alternative is Pareto-optimal
both from the point of view of the economic variables alone and from the point of view of
total utility. 
In such a case, non-economic motives may make it possible to reach an efficient
solution that would be impossible with economic variables alone. A numerical illustration of
this possibility is shown in Appendix 2. With unbounded rationality and perfect knowledge
of the utility values, the choice is clear to both agents. Therefore, we are back to the ‘trust
paradox’, where by including non-monetary variables and preferences perfectly aligned, we
have made real trust unnecessary. Or, perhaps, using the words in a slightly different way, one
might say that in this type of situation, A ‘trusts’ B’s preferences 100%, i.e., A can be sure
that B will ‘honor’ and that thus they can avoid an economically inefficient solution. 
The previous analysis leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: When agents value non-economic or non-quantitative variables, but
have unbounded rationality and perfect knowledge of the utilities, then the analysis is quite
similar to that of the simplest scenario: trust is either unnecessary (if utilities are aligned) or
else cannot be obtained. 
A special case: trust in unselfish values
A particular case of preferences about intangible, non-measurable variables is when
agents care for each other’s welfare. Formally, we can express this as each agent’s utility
being an argument of the other agent’s utility function. A numerical illustration of this
possibility is shown as Appendix 3. 
There, it has again been assumed that both agents have full knowledge of the other
agent’s utility. Hence, the probability that B will ‘honor’ A’s trust is either 0 or 1. Therefore,
the word ‘trust’ applied to this situation is just as paradoxical as before: knowing that the
other agent will do what is best for him/herself hardly coveys the intuitive idea of ‘trust’. It
might be argued, though, that there is a qualitative difference between the two types of
reasons for ‘trust’ involved in the two previous sections: ‘trusting’ individuals because of
their preferences with respect to whatever non-measurable variables (say, the type of work
they like, reputation, or environmental factors) is less related to the intuitive idea of ‘trusting’
than ‘trusting’ individuals because their preferences include our own well-being. The latter
case, at least, includes an attitude of benevolence towards another individual that we usually
associate with trust. But, as I will try to show next, trust becomes partly meaningful only
8when there is uncertainty about the other person’s preferences, and acquires full meaning
only in the context of bounded rationality.
It is interesting at this point to contrast these results with some notions found in the
literature. For instance, Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin (1992), distinguish between three
kinds of trust: deterrence-based, knowledge-based, and identification-based. Both deterrence-
based and knowledge-based trust fall entirely into the trust paradox. In the organizational
context, they suggest that deterrence-based trust can be achieved by three means: repeated
interactions, multiple interactions, or taking hostages. In any case, the result is a change in
the actual payoffs to individuals, so that it is in their best interest to act in the interest of the
organization. Knowledge-based trust, in these authors’ interpretation, consists of knowing
sufficiently the other party’s preferences so that an incentive (possibly monetary) can be
established that is enough to persuade the other party to behave as desired. Identification-
based trust, in contrast, would then be exactly as analyzed in this section, except for the fact
that the authors suggest several ways to achieve that identification (name, shared values,
proximity, etc.) that can exist only in the context of bounded rationality; and therefore we
defer discussing them until we explicitly consider that concept.
Portales, Ricart and Rosanas (1997), along similar lines, include deterrence-based
and knowledge-based trust in ‘calculative trust’, which again falls into the trust paradox.
Beyond calculative trust, they analyze integrity-based trust and personal trust. Integrity-based
trust is based on the trustee’s preferences and values, while personal trust is based on
altruistic motives and an imperfect knowledge of one’s own preferences. Again, as we will
show, this can only be rigorously analyzed in the context of bounded rationality. The second
part of this paper can be considered an expansion of their analysis, explicitly introducing
bounded rationality.
Imperfect knowledge of other agents’ preferences
Assume now that B’s utility function is not perfectly known to A. Then, the
(however imperfect) knowledge of A about B’s preferences will be reflected in A’s subjective
probability p of B honoring A’s trust. How likely is it that other dimensions of the results of
the problem (possibly including A’s monetary rewards) are more (or less) valuable for B than
hard money? It is this imperfect knowledge that makes this probability, in general, to be
between 0 and 1. 
With unbounded rationality, however, A is able to assess probability p exactly and
without ambiguities. A’s rational answer to the problem, therefore, is one of mere calculation.
Given the probability p of B honoring A’s trust, is A better off trusting B, or not trusting
him/her? Williamson’s (1993) notion of ‘calculative trust’, based on the seminal paper by
Deutsch, in which he claims that trust is just another name for risk, clearly applies to this type
of situation.
It is interesting to reconsider here the James (2002) distinction, following the
analysis by Lahno (1995), between ‘trust as prudence’ and ‘trust as hope’. In this paper’s
framework, if the assessment by A of the probability p of B honoring the trust is exact, with
no fuzziness or ambiguities, and if the computation is favorable to ‘trusting’ B in monetary
terms, A can be said to trust out of ‘prudence’, which would be equivalent to Williamson’s
‘calculativeness’. If, with the same assessment, the computation is unfavorable to A in
monetary terms, A can decide to ‘trust’ B out of a (non-rational) ‘hope’ that this time B will
9honor his/her trust. Of course, this hope is ‘irrational’, according to Lahno and James; or,
perhaps, one might say it is just as rational as the compulsive gambler’s belief that this time
he/she will win. ‘Trust as hope’, then, requires some bounds to rationality at least.
Alternatively, A can make his/her decision based on the belief that, in the future, it
will help create an atmosphere of trust in the environment such that the different A’s and B’s
will trust each other more; and that, in turn, would have to do with future interactions. But
this goes well beyond the mere ‘tastes’ usually represented by a utility function, and possibly
includes social and cultural elements beyond the rationalistic view.
The knowledge necessary to assess p, obviously, comes from previous contacts
(direct or indirect) between the two individuals involved, perhaps in many other previous
situations completely different from the ‘trust problem’ analyzed here. I will go back to the
determination of p in more detail later on; suffice it now to say that in absence of any specific
information, probability p would be the ‘a priori’ probability that the average person with
whom A interacts can be trusted. Then, in a world of unbounded rationality, that person
would be able to assess the probabilities of the signals, etc., and proceed to a Bayesian
updating of probability p.
REVISITING BOUNDED RATIONALITY
Ill-known payoffs and preferences
Most analyses of bounded rationality focus on the limited ability of human beings to
derive (or calculate) the consequences of their actions. Herbert Simon’s original formulation
of the concept, though, included three characteristics of human thought. The first is of course
the limited ability of human beings to foresee the consequences of their actions and the
logical implications of their thoughts. But also, human beings have limited ability to
anticipate how they will like the consequences of their actions, or how much they will like
the action itself: “It is a commonplace experience that an anticipated pleasure may be a very
different sort of thing from a realized pleasure” (Simon, 1997, p. 95). Finally, they have
limited ability to find possible courses of action as solutions to problems.
To analyze the role bounded rationality plays in the problem of trust, we basically
need the first two of these limitations; and it is in fact the second one that has greater
implications for that purpose. Let us proceed to analyze them in turn.
The first one essentially means that, in complex situations, agents may not be able to
know the actual payoffs to themselves, not only because of ‘external’, or ‘objective’,
uncertainty (which may be present, of course), but because they are not able to figure them
out, or determine their probabilities with any degree of accuracy. Being able to accurately
assess the probabilities of uncertain external events is one of the characteristics of unbounded
rationality. The inability to assess such probabilities includes the possibility of being unable
to foresee certain circumstances; or, in more formal terms, the possibility that agents may
assign a zero probability to events that are perfectly conceivable, because they have simply
‘overlooked’ them.  For A, this limitation represents uncertainties with respect to B’s
behavior in addition to the usual uncertainties about ‘objective’ events.
10The meaning of the second characteristic is like an extension of the first one: agents
are unable to predict accurately the subjective part of the payoffs, i.e., the utility to
themselves of the expected results. In other words, decision-makers have to anticipate future
preferences of which they cannot be sure. March states this distinction very clearly:
“The conception of choice enshrined in the axioms of contemporary decision
theory and microeconomics assumes optimization over alternatives on the basis of
two guesses. The first guess is about the uncertain future consequences that will
follow from alternative actions that might be taken. The second guess is about the
uncertain future preferences the decision-maker will have with respect to those
consequences when they are realized” (1987:155).
In the context of trust, the implications go beyond the uncertainty added to A about
B’s behavior that has already been considered above. The problem is particularly interesting
when the explicit, quantifiable payoffs are of the kind that lead to the trust problem, i.e., like
the monetary payoffs in Appendix 2. B, then, has an explicit incentive to ‘betray’. But what
is the value to B of the non-quantitative variables? Under unbounded rationality, the answer
is quite clear (at least to B). Thus, if the non-quantitative variables are valued as in
Appendix 2, the problem ends there, as we argued when analyzing this case. In contrast, with
bounded rationality, it may well be that honoring A’s trust is in the best interest of B, but B
him/herself may not know it (or, at least, not without some doubts or fuzziness). 
Also, under bounded rationality, B may be sorry after making his/her choice,
whatever that choice may be, which may change the alternative B chooses next time, if there
is a next time. For instance, B may at the moment of making the first decision ‘magnify’ the
importance of the quantitative variables and ‘betray’ A, only to realize –too late– that
the non-quantitative variables were at least as important as the quantitative ones. Of course,
the opposite may happen as well: on reflection, B may decide to ‘honor’ A’s trust, only to
find later on that the non-quantitative variables were not that important after all.
Human beings may face the same problem over and over again through time and
make different decisions because of learning, or because of different states of mind (emotion,
for instance) that bring into the focus of their attention some aspects of their lives and some
of their values to the relative neglect of others (Simon, 1983; Simon, 1987; Loewenstein,
1996). In the presence of a time constraint (which would be irrelevant in the case of
unbounded rationality) when decision time is scarce, an optimization approach may not be
feasible for an agent who is not-so-familiar with the problem (Selten, 1999). 
The ability to optimize may not be symmetrically distributed in a problem involving
trust (i.e., one of the agents may be more familiar with the problem and how to solve it than
the other). To be specific, if A is more familiar with the problem than B, A may think it a
possibility that B will choose ‘wrongly’ according to B’s own preferences, harming A in turn.
The possibility of A trusting B is obviously affected by this type of assessments.
Hirschman (1984) has argued that there are two kinds of activities. Some human
activities are instrumental, and are done in order to get a paycheck or an explicit reward. But
others are not: those activities that are undertaken ‘for their own sake’ or that ‘carry their own
reward’ fall into this category. Some activities have such an uncertain reward that they will
seldom be undertaken because of that. But there is an ‘education process’ in such activities:
not everybody likes them, only those people that have ‘learned to love them’. This is unlikely
to happen in simple, routine types of jobs or activities. But it is much more likely in more
complex situations, precisely where trust is of higher importance than in rather simple
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action into practice, which will be considered below. 
In general, preferences may change through time, depending on each agent’s
experience. An agent may ‘learn to love’ some variables or situations, and ‘learn to hate’
others. Intangible variables found in business situations, like the value placed in personnel
development, the public image of the company, or the internal human climate of the firm,
may change dramatically through time, as agents learn about their jobs, about the
organization and about themselves.
An important aspect of this learning process is persuasion. In a world of unbounded
rationality, there is no place for persuasion: every agent knows perfectly his/her preferences
(including the evolution of preferences through time), and there is no reason to change. In
contrast, in a world of bounded rationality, while some variables (monetary rewards, for
instance) are easy for everybody to appreciate, persuasion may play an important role in
‘learning to love’ some goals or activities. Barnard (1938) already stressed the importance of
persuasion as one of the crucial methods (together with incentives) to get people to work in
the interest of the organization. Nowadays, common everyday experience, as well the
momentum of communication courses in business schools, can be said to confirm Barnard’s
intuition.
The importance, for the analysis of trust, of the imperfect knowledge of one’s own
preferences, which implies the kind of learning just mentioned, cannot be overstated. In a
situation like the one shown in Appendix 2, the monetary rewards are perfectly known, and
their utility to the agents obvious; but the total utilities on the right-hand side of the Table
may depend (under bounded rationality) on whether someone has used some persuasion on
the other party. B, for instance, may be rather indifferent about any one (or several) of those
variables; but A may try to persuade B that such variables are worthwhile. If A believes B
has been persuaded, A may ‘trust’ B to achieve a result that is optimal economically and
otherwise. But, of course, if B is disappointed, his/her attitude next time around will surely be
different. So persuasion needs some element of truth to work in repeated interactions.
Systems of preferences and values
Bounded rationality is, according to Simon, the type of behavior that is intendedly
rational, but only limitedly so. Typically, it is ‘intendedly rational’ through a system of
preferences and values. Preferences of individuals are considered in economic theory to be
‘arbitrary’. Economic theory assumes rationality from the point of view of the consistency of
those preferences to avoid circularities; but except for that aspect, the preferences of two
individuals between, say, two goods, may be completely unrelated. In a world of unbounded
rationality, a preference map is a perfect reflection of the individual’s preferences and values;
and there is no distinction between different levels of values by importance, or by familiarity
with the specific situation.
Under bounded rationality, however, values and preferences may look substantially
different. Herbert Simon borrowed from the logical positivistic philosophy (Simon, 1997 ed.,
chapters 1, 3 and 4) the distinction between fact and value; and, in accordance with that
philosophy, he related rationality to the choice of means conducive to the achievement of
previously selected goals (1997, p. 4). The selection of goals itself would then not be rational
or irrational, it would just be a matter of taste on the part of the individuals.
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chain so that a given goal is often a means to achieve a higher end: “ends themselves are
often merely instrumental to more final objectives”. “Rationality, then, has to do with the
construction of means-ends chains of this kind” (Chapter 4, p. 73). Therefore, whether a final
end is achieved through an intermediate end or not is entirely a matter of fact, susceptible of
being empirically tested. For many human beings, most of the means pursued actively are
only means to higher ends. 
Preferences, then, operate essentially on the higher ends; and the lower ends are
obtained as a consequence. Rokeach (1973) claims that people have relatively few basic
values. Then, according to Fischhoff, Slovic and Liechtenstein,
“If, as Rokeach claims, people have relatively few basic values, producing an
answer to a specific value question is largely an exercise in inference. We must decide which
of our values are relevant to the situation, how they are to be interpreted, and what weight
each is to be given.” (1988: 401)
This applies in particular to the context of the results to be achieved in a business
firm, or in any organization in general. Profitability (or financial equilibrium) is always one
of the crucial variables desired by managers, but at the same time they also value ‘market
position’, or ‘competitive advantage’, or ‘organizational knowledge’, perhaps as a means to
achieve the higher end of profitability, or perhaps even as higher ends themselves. It is often
claimed that, in business firms, profitability is the overriding goal and that all other ends have
to be considered ‘intermediate’, and evaluated instrumentally as means. 
But individuals may not be able, or willing, to make decisions in accordance with
the relatively few basic values. Bounded rationality limits their ability to do so, and they have
spontaneous impulses that may not go in the same direction as these few basic values. Hence,
their ability to make choices that are logically consistent with them is also limited. However,
these limitations differ depending on the situation: in familiar situations, individuals are
better able to optimize with respect to higher ends, and, thus, they may have very definite
preferences in relation to lower ends:
“People are more likely to have clear preferences regarding issues that are
familiar, simple, and directly experienced. Each of these properties is associated
with opportunities for trial-and-error learning, particularly such learning as may be
summarized in readily applicable rules or homilies. Those rules provide stereotypic,
readily justifiable responses to future questions of values. When adopted by
individuals, they may be seen as habits; when adopted by groups, they constitute
traditions” (Fischhoff, Slovic & Liechtenstein, 1988: 399).
This may be seen as a specific instance of Simon’s view about the role of intuition
and emotion. Simon considers intuition as a ‘shortcut’ in the chain of reasoning, in situations
that are familiar, or that ‘ring a bell’ on similar experiences from the past  (Simon: 1987). The
Fischhoff et al. quote above may thus be seen as the application of that approach to the
selection of values: for familiar situations, individuals know (or think they know) what
preferences are coherent with the higher values; but in more unfamiliar situations, they might
not. Fischhoff et al. also provide an interesting list of the states of mind associated with not
knowing what you want in less familiar situations and some actions that follow (1988: 400).
That list is shown as Appendix 4.
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implicit assumption in fully rational models of behavior) is only one possibility among many.
Knowing what you want is, one might say, almost the anomaly. It is perfectly possible for
someone to have no opinion, or have an incoherent one, not to realize it, and make decisions
is spite of that. Living with incoherence is another possibility: in spite of higher ends being
incompatible with some lower ends, people may try to achieve both (and fail, of course).
Applied to a situation involving trust between two people, the exercise in inference
suggested by Fischhoff et al. in the above quotation would essentially consist in evaluating
the possible dimensions of the consequences of each alternative, and evaluating to what
extent the higher values are served. But the action to be initiated following this analysis may
be in contradiction with lower ends, or immediate desires, or impulses, and the individual
may be willing to be inconsistent. For instance, an individual may evaluate that Alternative 1
is better than Alternative 2 in terms of the higher values, but not in terms of the immediate
monetary rewards: if those of Alternative 2 are bigger, the individual may be willing to live
with that inconsistency. 
In the next section we will go into the problem of willpower, by which one
individual may really want to achieve a high objective, but be incapable of taking the
corresponding action in the short run. For the time being, we are not analyzing that problem
yet, but only the problem at the cognitive level.
It follows from the list in Appendix 4 that rationality is not equally bounded for
everybody. That is, some individuals try harder to be rational than others: some people are
more ‘reflective’, and willing to check for coherence and act coherently with the higher ends,
and others are more ‘impulsive’, or willing to pursue immediate, lower ends without much
reflection or need for coherence. And for any specific individual, the probability that he/she
is going to be more coherent is higher in familiar issues than in not-so-familiar issues, as
stated in the above quotes by Selten and Fischoff et al.
In summary, some people are willing to act coherently with their stable, higher
values in spite of their short-term urges to do otherwise, and some are less willing. The type
of behavior that consists of trying to be coherent with some stable, or permanent, set of
higher ends is what is usually called ‘integrity’. According to Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary, integrity is precisely the ‘adherence to a code of moral, artistic or other
values’ (Webster: 439). An important part of an individual’s trust in other individuals will
then reside in their integrity. To this type of trust we now turn our attention.
Trust based on integrity: value systems
If we reexamine the trust problem in the light of the previous section, we see that
trust acquires a different meaning. The trustor, A, can make an assessment of the basic values
of the trustee, B, and his/her willingness to make decisions consistent with that set of values.
This second part, of course, is what makes this situation different from the case of unbounded
rationality analyzed before: the first part is the same, as some knowledge of the other
individual’s set of values and preferences is necessary. With unbounded rationality, though,
consistency between values, and the preferences expressed in any action, exists by definition;
with bounded rationality, in contrast, there is an additional uncertainty about B’s integrity,
i.e., B’s capacity to make decisions consistent with that basic set of values and preferences. 
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the basic values. Thus, those values may be shared by A, or not. A may trust that B will (or
will not) do something because of the basic set of values A assumes B has, not because A
agrees with those values. Suppose, for instance, that A and B have different religious beliefs.
A may know that B’s religion forbids some practices, and that B is a strong believer. Then, A
may ‘trust’ B even if that action, forbidden by B’s religion, is not considered ‘bad’ by A at
all. The example of Yudhishthira in the Mahabharata epic, cited by Dasgupta (1988), is very
much to the point here. Renowned for his trustworthiness, Yudhishthira lied once to throw off
his unrighteous enemies. The lie worked because the enemies (having a completely different
value system that did not value trustworthiness) believed Yudhishthira would not lie. 
In the means-ends chains that human beings construct under bounded rationality,
intermediate values are means to more final values. Obviously, though, those higher values
need to be consistent with each other; otherwise a contradiction would require sacrificing one
of them. And, in specific contexts, contradictions may arise. In this context, the Mahabharata
example is particularly useful, because Yudhishthira would not lie to obtain immediate
benefits for himself. Truthfulness is to him an important (higher) value; but he lies to defeat
unrighteous enemies; and, thus, according to Dasgupta, qualifies as a consequentialist. A
slightly different way of looking at the same problem is as a conflict between two values both
of which are rather high in the hero’s preferences: truthfulness and the good of his people,
perceived as being incompatible at some point in time, and resolved in favor of defeating the
enemies even if it is through a lie, because the good of his people is ‘higher’.
The basic set of values may be more or less volatile, depending on specific
individuals and on their circumstances. But A’s beliefs about B’s set of basic values (the
content of those values, how ‘stable’ they are, and to what extent B is willing to make
decisions based on them) will determine A’s subjective probability p that B will honor or
betray his/her trust. Then, ‘trusting’ B means in this context A’s belief that B is willing to
make a given decision according to his/her entire set of values, beyond the explicit, monetary
values involved in the decision. That is the concept of trust based on integrity, which can be
expressed in the following proposition:
Proposition 5: Under bounded rationality, an essential element of trust in specific
situations is the trustee’s willingness to act in accordance with his/her system of values and
preferences, because this makes the behavior of the trustee more predictable in such specific
situations. 
No matter what the values are, and whether the trustor agrees with them or not, a
person may be willing to make decisions consistently with them, or, on the contrary, may be
rather impulsive. But, then, the result in terms of trust depends on the specific situation and
the specific values involved. In other words, we cannot say that ‘A trusts B’ in general, but
‘A trusts B’ only under some specific circumstances and in some specific issue. Of course,
the fact that the behavior of the trustee is predictable does not necessarily mean that the
trustee will generally make decisions that are favorable to the trustor. For this to be true, we
need to go one step further, to consider the kind of values that trustor and trustee have. 
From this point of view, values can be ‘purely selfish’ or ‘altruistic’; they may rate
truth-telling, or fairness, or friendship, or social welfare, or the common good (the ‘summum
bonum’ of the Schoolmen) high or low. If B’s values are ‘selfish’, then A can perhaps trust B
about a specific problem, or for a small class of decisions only. In contrast, if B’s values are
‘non-selfish’, A may be willing to trust B for a wide class of decisions.
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people under a variety of circumstances is that the trustee must have a system of values and
preferences in which some ‘non-selfish’, or ‘social’, values (or, simply, the interests of other
people) are placed high, and be willing to make decisions according to such a system of
values and preferences.
The problem of self-command: can you trust yourself?
In economic models of decision-making and organization (with unbounded
rationality), it is typically assumed that people are impatient, i.e., that they like to experience
rewards soon and costs later. This is captured in such models through the use of a utility
function discounting utility over time exponentially. Such preferences are called time-
consistent. But, in O’Donoghue and Rabin’s words, 
“Casual observation, introspection, and psychological research all suggest that
the assumption of time-consistency is importantly wrong. It ignores the human
tendency to grab immediate rewards and to avoid immediate costs in a way that our
‘long-run selves’ do not appreciate” (1999: 103).
The problem of the discrepancy between a person’s preferences at different times is
also an old one in philosophy. The basis of Aristotle’s criticism of Socratic ethics was that
very point. In Aristotle’s analysis, Socrates had said that “nobody acts in opposition to what
is best if he has a clear idea of what he is doing. He can only go wrong out of ignorance”.
The reasoning, however, and again according to Aristotle, “is in glaring contrast with
notorious facts”: people may know what is right and not do it because of weakness of will, or
lack of control (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII).
Schelling (1978; 1984) has studied the problem of time-inconsistency in depth.
Wanting to quit smoking but not doing it; Christmas accounts that protect your money from
yourself; free loans from the taxpayer to the IRS by understating the number of dependents;
placing the alarm clock across the room; setting the watch a few minutes ahead to deceive
oneself…
“In these examples, everybody behaves like two people, one who wants clean
lungs and long life and another one who adores tobacco, or one who wants a lean
body and another who wants dessert. The two are in a continual contest for control:
the ‘straight’ one often in command most of the time, but the wayward one needing
only to get occasional control to spoil the other’s best laid plan” (1978:290).
The ‘two selves’ are not equally important in Schelling’s analysis. He is obviously
partial to the ‘straight’ self. The section titled “Strategy and Tactic”, for instance, in the 1984
paper, consists of recommendations so that the ‘straight’ self can be in command of the
‘wayward’ self: relinquish authority, let somebody else hold your car keys, order your lunch
in advance, don’t keep liquor, or tobacco, in the house, order a hotel room without television,
do your food shopping after breakfast.....
Bazerman, Tenbrunsel & Wade-Benzoni (1998) formulate the problem in a slightly
different way. They suggest that the two-selves theory can be conveniently made easier, into a
‘want/should’ explanation, based on the empirical evidence available. When people are asked
what they want, their responses will be emotional, affective, impulsive, and hot-headed; whereas
when they are asked what they should do, their responses will be rational, cognitive, thoughtful
and cool-headed. These are then the two selves: the ‘want self’, and the ‘should’ self. 
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previous ones, attributes to ‘visceral factors’ (hunger, pain, sexual desire, moods and
emotions, etc.) the fact that people often act against their self-interest in full knowledge that
they are doing so. 
There should be no doubt that human beings are sometimes incapable of doing what
they think is in their best interest. Doing what one thinks one should do, or the dominion of
the should self over the want self, is what Aristotle called moral virtue. In the Aristotelian
account, moral virtue is acquired with practice. If that is true, one could expect that the
impact of the visceral factors, or the relative importance of the want and should selves, will
depend very much on each individual and his/her past history.
The organizational context makes things even more complex. A manager’s self-
interest may be substantially different from the (otherwise espoused) organizational
objective. The manager may say, for instance, that the main goal of the firm is value
maximization, and at the same time take actions that destroy long-term value, possibly for
short-run benefit. Jensen (2000) and Senge (2000) provide excellent examples of that
possibility. Jensen argues that this is the result of “the tendency of human beings to resort to
short-term value-destroying actions in the name of value creation” (2000: 50). Indeed, and
again according to Jensen, the latest financial scandals have only confirmed this tendency,
even to an extreme degree (2002). This analysis leads naturally to the following proposition:
Proposition 7: Under bounded rationality, a crucial element in trusting another
person is whether that person is able to put into practice what he/she thinks would be best for
him/herself in the long run, in spite of possibly attractive, short-term results. 
Doing what you think you should do: trust based on character
The analysis in the previous section introduces a new facet of the word ‘trust’.
Previously, we consistently referred to the decision-making process as if all decisions made
by an economic agent were to be immediately implemented with no problem. In the last
section we suggested that this may not be so, and that before implementation the decision
may change, not because of any new information coming in, or any changes in one’s tastes,
or any further thoughts on the basic values, but because of lack of control of oneself. In terms
of bounded rationality, it can be interpreted that the decision maker’s focus of attention shifts
to the more immediate, attractive variables, in preference to future variables that are in fact
preferable for an individual with unbounded rationality. To implement what one considers to
be the ‘right’ or ‘rational’ decision, willpower is needed. This is the Aristotelian point of
view cited in the previous section. 
Different people at different points in time will have different degrees of such
willpower. According to Aristotle, this develops through practice. Ordinarily, an individual’s
willpower to do what he/she considers to be the right thing is ‘too little’ (as in the Schelling
examples), but Benabou and Tirole (2002) have shown how, under some conditions, people
sometimes adopt excessively rigid rules that result in compulsive behaviors such as
miserliness, workaholism, or anorexia. Quite obviously, this ‘excess virtue’ is also acquired,
as in the Aristotelian account, through practice.
Hence, for the trustor A, to assess the probability p that the trustee, B, will ‘honor’
the trust, he/she has to evaluate in fact two probabilities: the probability pv, that the values of
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material rewards for doing the opposite), and the probability pw that B will in fact have the
willpower to put that decision into practice, given that the decision has been made, i.e.
(assuming they are independent),
p = pv . pw
Obviously, pv depends on B’s system of values, and the willingness B has to make
rational decisions according to that system; while pw depends on B’s willpower, and on the
availability of ‘attractive’ alternative actions to betray A. If there are no immediate, attractive
rewards for B to betray A, so that B has no problem honoring A’s trust, then pw will be equal
to 1; and the more attractive the rewards available to B for betraying A, the lower pw will be.
All this leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 8: Under bounded rationality, trust in another person is based on an
assessment of three factors: (1) adherence of the other person to a (stable) system of values;
(2) that such a system of values includes in some way social goals, or the interests of the
other person; and (3) the willpower of the other person to put into practice what she believes
she should.
On the empirical evaluation of the p’s
There is an important difference between the foundation of trust resting on judgment
and competence and the foundation of trust resting on preferences and integrity. The former
is entirely empirical: B cannot ‘fake’ a knowledge that he/she does not have, and once he/she
has it, will continue to have it in the future. B, of course, may have to adapt to new situations
in the future and learn more, and may be luckier or unluckier in the short run, but the fact
remains that the proof of B’s competence is in the empirical success in the (average) results
of his/her decisions. 
The latter, in contrast, cannot be entirely empirical. It is empirical to the extent that
all knowledge of the real world comes (obviously) from observation of empirical facts; but
there is an important problem associated with assessing someone else’s preferences and
values: they can be ‘faked’. In repetitive decisions, one agent may fake a preference for some
variables just to gain someone else’s trust, and, then, once this is achieved, betray the other
party. In fact, it is rather common for embezzlers to have an immaculate history of honesty,
even to excess, until, one day, they betray the trust deposited in them (showing, incidentally,
that the trustor was actually vulnerable). So, for both reasons, even if a given person has
shown unchanging preferences over a long period of time, one can never be sure that this
behavior will continue indefinitely.
This is closely related to a well-known problem in philosophy, the problem of
induction. Bertrand Russell (1959) remarked that the fact that for ages we have observed the
Sun rising every day does not necessarily imply that it is going to rise tomorrow. The chances
that the Sun will rise tomorrow vary greatly with the causal explanation we attribute to its
motion. If the sun rises because some giants light a ball of fire at night every night and raise
it in the morning, then, if one day they are too tired, or they feel whimsical, they may not
light it at all. Yet, this was an explanation believed by some of our ancestors, not too long ago
by historical standards. Currently, we believe in the laws of motion, gravitation and the
Earth’s rotation as causes of the sun rising, and this makes it much more unlikely that the sun
will not rise tomorrow. Too many things would have to change. The will of the giants may
change much more easily than the motion of enormous bodies and their laws.
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explanation we accept today, one might add), where there are no reasons for doubting the
regularity of the phenomenon. But if induction is a complex issue in the natural sciences, it is
even more complex when the system under study is a human being. The parable of the
inductivist chicken provided (again) by Russell is very much to the point here:
“Domestic animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds
them. We know that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be
misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last
wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of
nature would have been useful to the chicken” (Russell, 1959: 35).
In other words, mere repetition of a given choice by one individual is not a good
basis to infer that it will be repeated again. Human beings are purposeful systems, and may
have intentions completely different from the ones that seem obvious; and unless there is
some understanding of the real reasons why they act, any forecast of their next action may
turn out to be completely wrong. 
Bounded rationality is again a determining concept. With unbounded rationality,
human beings would have unlimited capacity for ‘faking’ preferences; but they would also
have unlimited capacity for discounting for that fact. That is, it would not be too difficult for
one person to try to ‘trick’ the others, but the others would immediately assign a probability
to that eventuality and incorporate it in their subjective probability. The success of such a
strategy would therefore be in doubt. 
With bounded rationality, one agent may try to internalize the value and preference
system of the other, partly through previous formal interactions of the same kind, but partly
through other means of communication: words, body language, common friends, shared
beliefs, attitudes… All these factors are relevant to determine the probability p that B will
honor A’s trust. The crucial fact, however, is that mere historical repetition of a given
alternative in previous, similar situations (‘reputation’, if by that word we simply mean the
other person’s track record) is hardly enough. Internalizing the way the other person thinks
and her value system is an important element in the assessment of the probability of the other
person honoring or betraying trust.
Individualistic-rationalistic approach versus social and cultural approaches
This paper has taken the individualistic-rationalistic approach, which starts from the
assumption that trust is rationally based. The analysis in the last section, though, suggests that
the social and cultural approach is also needed as a complement. When evaluating the
probability of someone else’s behavior, social and cultural factors cannot be ignored, mainly in
the broader context of not referring only to a specific decision situation, in the ‘delegation’
setting mentioned before. But we want to show here that, while the individualistic-rationalistic
approach is incomplete to deal with the problem of trust, some of the characteristics of trust
that are purported to be socially and culturally based are often a social reflection of the
rationalistic approach.
Several researchers (e.g., Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995) have emphasized
‘propensity to trust’ as one of the important characteristics that conditions actual trust, either
suggesting that it is each person’s personal experience that is at the base of this propensity, or
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(Hofstede, 1980). 
As we have seen, Fischoff et al. (1988: 399) argued that habits and traditions can be
seen as trial-and-error learning summarized in rules and homilies, and that they provide
stereotypic, readily justifiable responses to questions of values. This is particularly relevant in
our context, because it means that the bases of trust can be considered to be instrumental
from the beginning. Intuitions, rules and traditions provide an initial a priori probability p that
trust will be honored by the other party, and any subsequent interactions of any kind (verbal
or non-verbal communication, real actions between the two individuals...) may modify that
probability. But of course, for specific individuals this accumulated learning is transmitted
only as a social habit or tradition.
Many of the individualistic-rationalistic models justify social beliefs and attitudes
towards trust. Thus, Neilson (1999) develops a model where two agents interact repeatedly in
a prisoner’s dilemma, and shows that an agent A is willing to do ‘costly’ favors to another
agent B if A expects to receive favors in return in the future. His approach is quite clearly
individualistic-rationalistic; but, of course, creating the social climate where one expects
reciprocity in doing favors makes it easier for cooperation to exist. Along similar lines,
Spagnolo (1999) shows how workers have an incentive to cooperate if the probability that the
other party will cooperate is large enough. Valley, Moag and Bazerman (1998) show how,
with asymmetric information, the communication medium (which obviously is a social
creation) affects the distribution of outcomes, reflecting different degrees of truth-telling and
trust across the media. Tullock (1999) changes the usual conditions of experiments on the
prisoner’s dilemma (i.e., does not pre-select contestants, does not prevent them from
communicating, and does not change partners in the middle), and gets a very high degree of
cooperation, in contrast with what happens under the usual conditions.
Thus, many unconscious habits may have their origins in rational attitudes.
Dasgupta provides a good description of many of these factors from the rational perspective:
“We form an opinion on the basis of his background, the opportunities he has
faced, the courses of action he has taken, and so forth. Our opinion is thus based
partly on the theory we hold of the effect of culture, class membership, family line,
and the like on a person’s motivation (his disposition) and hence his behavior”
(1988: 54).
But notice that two kinds of elements enter into this description. Background,
culture, class membership, family line, and so on may be considered (paradoxically perhaps)
elements of the individualistic-rationalistic approach. They are elements that may indicate the
kind of person the hypothetical trustee is, and what can be specifically expected from such a
person: first-hand experiences, reputation, track record, and so on. 
In contrast, “the theory we hold of the effect of....” is clearly a cultural creation of
the social group to which the would-be trustor belongs. Obviously, though, those social
influences do not exhaust the explanation of one individual’s propensity to trust, which by
necessity must include personal factors.
The line between the individualistic-rationalistic point of view and the influence that
the social environment exerts upon individuals is difficult to draw. Probability p is partly
determined by the social background of the individual, and partly by the individual’s direct
experience. But social, cultural and relational aspects of trust have a background of
instrumentality behind them. 
20Tyler and Degoey (1996: 339) analyze in some depth the reasons why the
instrumental view might not be enough to explain the phenomenon of trust. They give three
arguments. First, if trust were merely instrumental, “people will care about trustworthiness
when they are dependent on the organization or vulnerable to harm”. Instead, what they
found is that trustworthiness is central when people have “a personal connection with the
authorities or identify with the organization”. While this claim may of course be true, a
“personal connection” with the authorities, or “identification” with the organization requires
some knowledge of the authorities’ value system, on which that trust can be based, according
to this paper’s analysis, on an instrumental basis.
Second, one would expect from the instrumental model that trust would be “linked
to satisfaction with the authority’s decisions”; while if it is relational, it should be “linked to
judgments about the neutrality of authorities and the degree to which these authorities treat
their subordinates with dignity and respect”. Again, under a rational-instrumental approach it
is perfectly possible to argue that the value system of the authorities is at the root of the
subordinates’s trust in them. 
Finally, if trust is instrumental in character, “judgments about the competence of
authorities should be more strongly linked to people’s willingness to accept an authority’s
decision than judgments about the benevolence of authorities”. The way the problem of trust
has been analyzed in this paper, that claim would have to be denied. To the extent that the
willingness to accept an authority’s decision is related to trust in that authority, that trust
might in fact be based partly on competence, and partly on value systems, a particular case of
which is benevolence. 
In summary, and as I have stated already, some of the characteristics of trust that are
often assumed to be socially and culturally based, may also be a social reflection of a
rationalistic attitude.
RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS
Trust is a complex subject. Elusive, as was recognized from the beginning, and with
many facets. It can have very different meanings, which we have tried to explore analytically
in this paper, and it is time now to recapitulate and see where everything stands.
A first conclusion is that if rationality is unbounded and information is symmetrical
among the two agents involved, “trust” cannot exist in any meaningful way. Under these
conditions, we are led to what James called “the paradox of trust”: the only possible way to get
one person to trust another is by changing the payoffs and making trust unnecessary. Formally,
in a one-time interaction, this essentially means making an enforceable explicit contract where
the two parties commit themselves to the action that leads to Pareto optimality. 
The possible existence of utility for variables of a qualitative, intangible nature does
not substantially change the conclusion, provided rationality is unbounded, and therefore the
two agents know perfectly what they want, and make no mistakes. What matters, then, is
total utility to the two agents. If they both value the outcomes of the branch of the “trust-
honor” tree higher than any other branch, there will be no need for trust.
Trust can be meaningful, though, even in the absence of any conflict of interest, to the
extent that there is asymmetrical information about outcomes and the trustor “decentralizes”
21the decision because of the specialized information of the trustee, “trusting” that his/her
information is ‘better’. What in the literature has been called “trust in competence” is related
to that meaning. This would be the second conclusion. 
Bounded rationality, which in this article’s context essentially stresses the point that
agents do not have full knowledge of their own preferences and values, completely changes
the meaning of trust, and the reasons for its existence. Under bounded rationality, preferences
are organized in ‘value systems’, but decisions made may or may not be consistent with
them. A person’s willingness to act according to the ‘higher values’ (typically few in number)
is one possible reason to ‘trust’ that the person will follow some course of action that may be
in that person’s own best interest, but perhaps not the most attractive in terms of the
immediate variables of both effort and results. ‘Trust’, then, means the belief by the trustor
that the trustee will make the decision according to his/her real value system, even if some
immediate variables push her in the opposite direction. That is our third conclusion. 
The fourth conclusion is rather intuitive. If, besides being consistent with a value
system, some of the trustee’s ‘higher values’ are non-selfish, and so include, say, truthfulness,
friendship, social welfare, etc.., they provide a better basis for trust, i.e., the trustor may
believe that the trustee will not take advantage of his/her vulnerabilities. Here, in contrast
with the previous situation, where values were not necessarily non-selfish, the concept of
trust may go beyond specific situations and extend to a class of decisions. This is, therefore,
the concept that provides a foundation for taking some risks in situations of decentralization
of authority, giving power to the trustee for a certain type of decisions.
Finally, whatever the actual preferences and values are, the trustee’s action depends
on his/her capacity to actually put into practice what he/she thinks is good according to
his/her own system of values; and therefore, trusting someone means trusting his/her capacity
to do precisely that. 
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Suppose that the two agents share equally the result of two possible alternative
actions, a1 and a2, which depends on a state variable that can take two values, 0 and 1. The
two agents are risk-neutral, but have different information about the state variable. Agent A is
completely ignorant about that variable, and attributes equal probability to both states. Agent
B is an ‘expert’ and has a different probability assessment (say, 70% for state 0, and 30% for
state 1). The payoff matrix for each agent is shown as Table 1.
Table 1
Payoff matrix
Action a1 Action a2
State 0 10 8
State 1 –5 –2
Under A’s probability assessment, action a2 is preferable (it has an expected value of
3, while that of a1 is only 2.5); while under B’s probability assessment, a1 has an expected
value of 5.5, and a2 of 5, making the first action more desirable. In this uncertainty context,
‘A trusts B’ may have a meaning completely unrelated to the difference in results for the two
agents: A may trust B’s information better than his/her own.
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In the context of the data in Table 2, the obvious choice for B, if trusted, is to honor
A’s trust (his/her utility is greater); and for A, knowing this, the probability that B will honor
his/her trust is 1, and his/her obvious choice is “trust”. If the utility to B of betraying A when
trusted were instead (say) 200, then his/her obvious choice would be to betray; and A,
knowing this, would assign a probability of 0 to B honoring his/her trust.
Table 2
Utility for non-measurable variables
Monetary rewards Total utility
B honors B betrays B honors B betrays
To A To B To AT o  BT o  AT o  B T o  AT o   B
A trusts 10 10 –5 20 150 150 100 100
A doesn't 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Assume there is certainty, and that the monetary results are as shown on the left-
hand side of Table 3. Let us further assume that the utility functions for monetary rewards are
logarithmic, namely, that for each agent, his/her selfish utility is
u(xi) = log (5+xi), 
while the altruistic utility is 
v(xi) = ki log (5+xj), 
and additive to the former, so that total utility is 
wi(.) = log (5+xi) + ki log(5+xj)
For a completely selfish individual, k=0; and the larger the k, the more ‘benevolent’
that individual will be towards the other individual. Negative values of k would, of course,
represent “malevolent” individuals who dislike others being happy. 
Then, taking the numbers in our example, the corresponding utilities are as shown in
Table 3. We can see there that both players have “trust” as a dominant strategy now, and it is the
one that leads to a Pareto-optimal solution from a purely monetary point of view. A’s utility, in
the event that B ‘betrays’, is minus infinity, which might be interpreted to mean that A would
die of starvation, or live in total deprivation. B is unwilling to be party to that eventuality, and
so is willing to sacrifice part of his/her own wealth to prevent it from happening.
Table 3
Non-selfish utilities
Monetary rewards Total utility
B honors B betrays B honors B betrays
To A To B To AT o  BT o  AT o  B T o  AT o   B
A trusts 10 10 –5 20 5.42 5.42 –∞ –∞
A doesn't 0 0 0 0 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22
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Psychological states associated with not knowing what you want




Trying to form one




Trying to form a coherent opinion
Having a coherent opinion 
Accessing it properly
Accessing only a part of it
Accessing something else
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